Introduction
Suppose that a decision is to be made when the state of the world is uncertain but further information about it can be obtained by measurement or experimentation. It is given that the decision must be logically consistent with the decision maker's own preferences for con sequences, as expressed by numencal utilities, and with the weights he attaches to the possible states of the world, as expressed by probabilities. This is the clas sical P!_Oblem of decisiOn analysis (Raiffa and Schlaifer 1961; Savage 1954) .
If an analyst is asked why he believes a decision to be correct or why the observed outcome occurred, he can offer an explanation that relates theories, facts, and the context. Although explanation facilities have long bee n considered as cential to the construction of expert systems in AI, it is only recently that attempts liave bee n made to inte� the explanation facility with the basic theory-driven inductive approach of decision analysis (LaDglotz et al. 1986 ).
In machine learning, the term explanation has been given a precise meaning in the context of explanation-based generalization (EBG), a technique used to generate an explanation of a concept after ob serving a single training example (Mitchell et al. 1986 ). An explanation in EBG is a proo f, based on prior knowledge, that an observed event is a deductive im plication of a set of propositions. The explanation is generalized to cover not only the observed mstance but a more general class of instances.
An explanation in EBG serves quite a different p�se than an explanation produced by an explanation facility in an expert system. In an expert system, an explana tion is used to show the user the reasoning process behind a conclusion. The explanation has been entered by a programmer into the expert system and is not used by the system's inference procedures. In EBG, the explanation has not been written into the system by a programmer but is generated by the system's own in ference procedures. If a subsequent activity requires using kilowledge contained in the explanation, the system's inference procedures will have access to and can manipulate the explanation. It is as if the program can explain to itself what it has learned.
Learning programs in AI have not, as a rule, been able to deal gracefully with noisy data, and EBG is no ex ception. The problem that these programs have in dealing with stochastic influences probably is related to the ongins of the approach in a tradit10n that em phasizes the use of deductive logic. EBG can trace its roots to the goal regression techniques developed for the STRIPS robot problem-solving system by Fikes et al.(1972) . From tfiose beginnings to the present day, learning pro�s from the AI tradition have tended to limit therr domain to non-stochastic learning and have put the emphasis on symbolic computation.
Learning that takes place in a stochastic environment has been studied most often in fields that are outside of the mainstream of AI work. The historical roots are different from those of AI, the journals are different, and the practitioners are often in other academic deparunents. Stochastic learning is central to much of the work done in pattern recognition, stochastic adap tive control theory, dynamic progx:amming, Bayesian decision theory, and statistical inference. The em phasis in these areas is on quantitative methods as op posed to symbolic computatton.
In this paper symbolic methods will be integrated with �uanti tative methods to develop a procedure that can 1) generate a causal explanation of observed events, 2) make decisions based on that explanation, and (3) use feedback to revise the explanation and decisions. This requires solving two problems which I call the explanation problem and the decision problem. The explanation problem requires the generation and revi sion of a probabilistic causal explanation relating the state of the world to uncertain outcomes that are the consequences of actions initiated by the decision maker. The decision problem r�uires using the ex planation to make a logical choice amon � alternative courses of action in the decision maker s uncertain world.
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(1986), EBG is a technique �or learning bY. general�!Jlg explanations. The system 1S shown a smgle trammg example of an event. It first constructs a specific ex planation for the event, and then it generalizes this ex planation so that it covers a class of similar events.
The EBG method requires the following information:
(1) Goal Concept: A concept definition describing the concept to be learned. An example used by Mitchell et al. (1986) of a goal concept is Safe-to-Stack{x,y). The goal was to determine for a pair of objects <x,y> if it is safe to stack x on top of y. The objects were a box and a table, and the initial definition used the predicate, weight(x). It was assumed that there was no direct way to measure the weight of the box, but that its densicy and volume could tie measured. The fmal generalized explanation therefore used the terms volume(x) and density(x) along with the relationship between volume, density, and weight (2) Training Example: A s�ific example of the con cept in terms of observable features. Ail instance of a training example for the goal Safe-to-Stack(x,y) would be that a box with given density and volume can be safely stacked on a table with given weight and stur dyness.
(3) Domain Theory: A set of rules and facts sufficient to prove that the training example is an example of the goal concept.
(4) Operationality Criterion: A requirement that the imal generalized concept definition be described in terms of the predicates used to describe the training example or m terms of a selected set of easily evaluated predicates from the domain theory. It.is as sumed that the initial definition includes at least one unobservable term, thus failing to satisfy the Operationality Criterion.
Given this information, an EBG system will construct a specific explanation of why the training example satisfies the goal concept The specific explanation JS a lo�ical proo f that demonstrates that the event is en tailed by prior information in the form of Horn clauses in the knowledge base. The proof is generalized by J>ropagating constraints on the variable bmdings among ihe various proof rules, but dropping any constraints introduced by the �illc example. The EBG tech nique for generalizing uses a form of goal regression that has been shown to be equivalent to an augmented version of resolution theorem proving for Hom Clause When EBG has constructed the valid generalization from the training example, the system is said to have learned the goal concept The kind of learning done by using EBG can be characterized as bemg truth preserving and nonampliative. By truth preserving I mean that there is no possibility that a conclusion about an event will be false. By nonampliative I mean that nothing is learned that was not previously, at least im plicitly, known to the system. In EBG, smce all events that could possibly be observed can be explained by the available domain theory and all explanations use valid forms of deductive logic, the explanation is only an explicit formulation of knowledge that was already im plicitly available. Any learning that has taken place is similar to learning that occurs when one completes a mathematical proof of a theorem.
In contrast to the learning done by EBG, inductive learning is not truth preserving but it is ampliative. The generalizations and predicuons that are based on inductive inferences can be wrong, which is the price we pay in order to learn something new about the world.
Since all the knowledge to generate the final goal con cept is available in the knowledge base, wh� JS a train ing example used?
Why not just let ihe system generate the proof tree of the final goal concept from the initial defmition and the domain knowledge? The standard reply has been that the use of a teaming ex ample and generalization procedure makes the search more efficient There is, however, another reason that I would like to l>ropose as being significant The training example provides a contextual constraint so that the gener3lized proof structure is also a meaningful and relevant explanation of the goal concept.
If EBG is to be used when there is a great deal of domain knowledge, it is likely that there will be more than one valid proof structure that entails the goal con cept. For example, the goal concept Safe-to-Stack(x,y) could include clauses stating that x is not made of glass and has a flat bottom surface while y has a flat toP.
surface and is level. If our objective is to determine if x can be stacked on y without crushing y, and if x and y will always be caidboard boxes of sunilar size but different weights in the problem context, then although the facts and theory concerning flat surfaces and glass containers could be part of a valid proof structure, they are irrelevant to the desired goal concept. EBG will omit them from the explanations it generates.
The problem of finding the appropriate explanation clearly involves more than merely finding a valid rela tion between theory and face It depends on a three term relation between theory, fact, and context (van Fraassen 1980). An explanation can be considered to be the answer to a why-question about the occurr ence of a certain event. Why JS it safe to stack object x on object y? A satisfactory answer depends on the context in which the question was asked. EBG solves the problem of determining context by requiring a training example to be presented to the system and by using a generalization technique that follows the SJ>ecific proo f actually used in the exJ>lanation of the training example (DeJong and Mooney 1986). It igt1ores the other pos sible ways to complete a proof. The use of a single training example to determine context is one of the major benefits that EBG brings to theory-based induc tive inference.
We have see n that EBG can generalize and determine context on the basis of a single training example. Its efficiency at generalization has been bought at the cost of requiring substantial domain knowledge about the world. There . appears, however, to be another as sociated cost The capacity to do inductive inference has seemingly been eliminated. This has led resear chers to the opinion that an important next step in the machine-learnmg research program is to try to integrate empirically-based inducuve methods with EBG (Mitchell et al. 1986; Lebowitz 1986 ). The remainder of this paper will propose how this might be done.
Combining Probabilistic Reasoning, Utilities, and EBG
EBG has several important limitations that must be relaxed before it can be applied to generate and modify explanations used in T-BlL. First, EBG builds ex- planations using purely deductive, non-probabilistic logic. We need to allow probabilistic and statistical reasoning to enter into its explanations. Second, al though EBG constructs explanations and learns con cepts, the concept is learned in a vacuum. I am inter ested in concepts that are learned because they will have a certain utility for a future decision. The goal concept must therefore be linked to a decision with observable and measurable consequences. Third, in EBG no method has been proposed for revising an ex planation on the basis of new information. A method for incremental updating of the existing explanation is needed. Fourth, EBG cannot represent disJuncts in its explanations. A technique for including disjunctive propositions will be introduced.
Probabilistic reasoning will be integrated with EBG by associating probablities with every proposition in the explanation.
Propositions will be referred to as hypotheses if the probability of their being true is less than one. Definitions will have probability one that they are true. Probabilities are to be interpreted as quantitative measures of belief in the truth of a hypothesis. Prior probabilities are conditional on the context and background conditions which are only made explicit to a partial degree in an explanation. Where possible, probabilities will be given a objective interpretation; otherwise they are subJective probabilities. Incremental updating will be done by applying Bayes' theorem.
The combination of probabilistic reasoning, utilities, and EBG to do theory-based inductive learnmg should be referred to by a unique name in order to maintain the distinctions between it and the other methods for doing inductive inference, learning, and decision analysis.
I will call the methOd Theory-Based In ductive Learning, and will refer to it simply as T BIL.
T-BIL requires information that is substantially dif ferent than EBG in order to solve problems and generate explanations. Instead of proviiling an initial definition of a goal concept, T-BIL requires an initial statement of a ilecision problem. In its most general form, the decision problem requires sequential deci sions to be made wnen the state of the world, and thus the outcome of any decision, is uncertain. Moreover, it is assumed that additional information can be obtained at a cost, either by performing an experiment or by some other means. Both EBG and T-BIL require a domain theory. There is no essential difference in the way this term is used in EBG and T-BIL.
T-BIL uses a training example, as does EBG, as the basis for its generalization procedure. In EBG we can consider the mitial goal concept to provide the bound ary conditions for tfie most general version of the con cept and the training example to provide the boundary conditions for the most specific version of the concept. Goal regression constructs the bridge between those two boundaries, finding the right mix of specialization and generalization. In T-BIL, goal regression will ac complish the same task, speciiilizing from the initial statement of the decision problem and generalizing from the training example to find the right level of explanation that links the two. This is the major con tribution that symbolic methods from machine learning make to T-BIL.
The contributions that quantitative methods make to T-BIL are associated with the use of Bayesian decision 239 theory. The decision maker using T-BIL observes the outcome of his initial decisions and uses this infor mation to update beliefs and revise decisions. Instead of referring to these additional observations as training examples, I will call them observation reports. The distinction is maintained, therefore, between the train ing example, which is used with goal regression to generate an explanation, and observation reports, which are used with Bayesian updating to modify the explanation.
In EBG the operationality criterion is a restriction that forces the generalization to use terms that were used in the training exam,Ple. In T -BIL, I would like to use a concept of operatJ.onalism similar to that first proposed by the Nobe1 physicist P.W. Bridgman (1927) . The idea as adopted by many scientists is that the terms in a theory be reducible to operations, usually involving ob servation and measurement, that can be publicly repeated. There must also be a high degree of agree ment among the observers as to the outcome of the operation. In essence, theoretical explanations have meaning only through their connection with the observ able. Since this is different from the operationality criterion of EBG, I have called the requirement an operational explanation.
Before discussing how to combine decision anal}'sis with EBG, let us look more closely at the decision problem. The general decision problem that interests us is dynamic and stochastic: It involves decisions over time that transform one uncertain state into another. The decision maker chooses acts so as to maximize the sum of the expected utilities over time. It is assumed that the time involved is not long enough to require using discounted present values. The chosen sequence of decisions is called a policy or a plan. A plan that permits the decision maker to maximize the sum of the expected utilities is called an optimal plan. This description of the decision problem casts it as a problem in stochastic adaptive control theory (Bellman 1961; Dreyfus and Law 1977) .
More formally, the decision problem of finding the op timal plan can be described as a dynamic max101ization problem
where the variables and relevant features of the deci sion problem are defmed as follows:
(i) Di: Decision set at time i. The finite set of potential acts by the decision maker. A decision maker can se�t a s�cific act { d} from the set of possible acts Di-{d1, d2, ... , dnlt.
(ii) Xi: State of the world at time i. A state refers to the fmite set of feasible outcomes of the world. Each out come has associated with it a joint probability measure.
(iii) Ui: Utility evaluation in the state Xi. The decision maker assigns utility U(d, x) for each decision and each feasible outcome. Probability times utility is expected utility, EU(X, D).
(iv) P(X/d;): Probability assessment on Xi. For every decision d; the decision maker directly or indirectly assigns a joint probability measure P(X/d;) to each possible outcome in the state at time i.
(v) T: Transformation rules. A set of rules that map each element of Xi into an element of Xi +l'
The terms and the information required for T-BIL are presented in more detail as follows:
(1) Decision Problem: A problem that requires the logical analysis of choice among courses of action from the decision set, D i• when the outcome of any act depends on the current state of the world, Xi, which is known with uncertainty, and it is possible at a cost to obtain additional information about the current state.
The decision maker's preferences for consequences are expressed by his utility evaluation Ui, and the weights he attaches to possible outcomes are expressed by his probability assessment P(X/di).
(2) Training Example: A specific example of a correct solution to the decision l'roblem. The training example should contain information that is sufficient, given ihe assumed background conditions, to solve at least one stage of a sequential decision problem.
(3) Domain Theory: A set of rules and facts sufficient to prove that the training example is a solution to one stage of the decision problem. The domain theory ei ther includes the necessary prior J>robabilities and as sumptions about the conditiomil independence of various hypotheses or can obtain them from another information source.
(4) Observation Reports: Reports to the decision maker on the outcome of measurements, experiments, que�es, or decisions that. provide additional infor mation relevant to the decisiOn problem. Observation reports can contain the same data as a training ex ample, but a training example is an instance used m the generalization process while an observation report is an mstance used to revise J>robabilities associated with the already-generalized explanation.
(5) Opera�U?nal Explll nafion: A requ!rement that the terms used m the generalized explanation be reducible to terms that are observable and measurable in the problem contexts. Theoretical explanations have meaning only through their connection with the observ able. Thus Clecision procedures, the training example and observation reports must ultimately be based on observable and measurable terms.
Given this information in (1)-(4) and the constraint in {5),. the system will generate a specific explanation to Jl;lStify why the training example solves the initial deci Sion problem. This explanation is structured as an in fluence diagram that is formed by using the inference rules !ll d tlie conditional independence relations in the domal!l theory. The next step is to generalize this ex plana�on, usmg goal regressmn. The generalized ex pla!Jation �o�sequently c�>Vers a class of ins�ces while specialized explanation only covers the traming example. The decision maker will make a decision observe the outcome, and revise his beliefs, thus moving from one state to the next
A Brief Review of Influence Diagrams
In EBG, the explanation structure is a proof tree formed using first-order logic. In order to represent causal explanations that involve probabilistic measures of uncertainty, the proof tree will be replaced by a graph called an iilfluence diagram (Howard and Matheson 1981; Shachter 1986; Pearl 1986 ). Readers having a backwound in decision theory are un doubtedly famiher with influence diagrams; but those whose background is AI may find this brief reveiew of influence diagrams useful.
An .influence diagram is an acyclical directed graph havmg two types of nodes: chance nodes and decision nodes. A chance node corresponds to a random vari able and is drawn as a circle. A decision node is drawn as a rectangle.
Any well-formed influence diagram can be trans formed into a decision tree. Decision trees rapidly be come unwieldy, so that in complex problems they do �ot provi�e as clear, �oncise, or intuitive an explana tiOn as mfluence diagrams.
Moreover influence diagrams provide an explicit represe�tation of pro��bilistic dependencies that are only implicit in deciSion trees.
Cond_itioning influences are represented by arrows entenng chance nodes. These arrows show the vari ables on which the probability distribution of the c�ance nod�. variable will be conditioned. They in dicate conditional dependence. In the diagram below varia!'!e C deJX?nds on B and B depends on A, but C is conditionally mdependent of A. This means that P(C/B)=P(C/B,A). In other words, any effect that A has on C occurs through its effect on B. If there wen� ��ther arc d�ctly con�ecting A and C, then the possibihty would exist that C IS not conditionally inde pendent of A. It is preferable to omit the arc between two nodes that are conditionally independent because the graph then explicitly represents the independencies.
An important consequence of Bayes' theorem is that arcs that connect chance nodes can be reversed without mak�g �y incorrect or additi<?nal assertions about the possible mdependence of vanables provided that all probabil�ty assignments are based on the same set of mformation @oward and Matheson 1981).-Bayes' �eorem permits one to calculate P(A/B) or P(B/AJ in differently given the same information.
S.in . � arcs betw�n chance nodes only indicate the pos sibility of conditional dependence, it is possible to add arcs between any pair of chance nodes without chang ing the meaning of the diagram. One cannot, however remove an arc unless conditional independence is proposed .
lnfo�ma�ional infllfe.nces are represented by arrows leading mto a decision node. They represent a basic cause-effect ordering. In the following diagram the arr ow from the chance node D to the decision node E is an informational influence. This means that the Influence diagrams are based on the supposition that a single person (or machine) is the decision maker. Another related assumption is the "no forgetting" rule. All information that corresponds to events that occur before a decision is made 1s available to the decision maker. He cannot "forget" that something happened.
Influence diagrams must be acyclical. It is sometimes the case that a directed cycle will be formed if a deci sion leads to successor chance nodes which have ar rows leading into a chance node that is a predecessor to the decision. In that case it is usually possible using Bayes' theorem to reverse an arc between two chance nodes, thus eliminating the cycle.
A Robot's Choice-Of-Path Problem

Problem Statement
Dynamic programming is an optimization procedure that is applied to problems requiring a sequence of in terrelated decisions. When the outcomes of the deci sions are stochastic and there is feedback, the theory for solving these problems is frequently referred to as stochastic adaptive control theory or Bayesian decision theory. Very many of the problems associated with the techniques and theory in tliis area can be represented as a form of the shortest-path problem (Dreyfus and Law, 1977) . The following robot's choice-of-path problem is simply a specific instance of the very general stochastic shortest-path problem. It has been structured to be a further development of the Safe-to-Stack(x,y) example used by Mitctiell et al. (1986) .
Suppose that we have available an autonomous mobile robot that can do a variety of tasks. We would like the robot to follow a path from point A to point B using the shortest route, subject to certain constraints. Let us further suppose that the route traverses 200 intersec tions. At each intersection the robot can observe that the shortest path is blocked by a box and a .4, tlle table is believed to be Fragile with P(Fragile)=.80 or Sturdy with P(Sturdy)=.20, weight is equal to volume times density, a densimeter can measure a box's density with a random error, and SJ>ecific utilities are attached to each outcome. In terms of the T-BIL method presented in previous sections, we can describe the robot's problem as follows:
(1) Decision Problem: Choose the PathDecision in each state that will maximize the decision maker's total utility of going from an initial point A to a terminal point B. ll requires choosing either the Ions-or short path at each intersection. The utility assocrnted with each outcome is measured in arbitrary units called utils. If the short path is taken, tlle box is stacked on the table, and ilie table does not break, the outcome is worth +100 utils. If the table breaks, the outcome is worth -100 utils. If the long path is taken, the certain outcome is worth+ 10 utils. 
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(2) Training Example: The ShortPath is chosen. Given this information, the system will generate an in fluence diagram, which is the explanation structure that shows why the trainiJ!g examrle is a solution to the decision problem. Figure  shows an influence diagram that corresponds to the specific explanation for the training example. Figure 2 presents the influence diagram that corresponds to the generalized explana tion that exists in state 1, the situation when the robot arrives at the first intersection and must make a deci sion. In Figures 1 and 2 , I have used a diamond shape to indicate the final outcome where utility is assigned.
Box-0 is stacked on
It corresponds to a specialized chance node. Figure 3 presents the decision tree for state 1. Figure 2 shows the explana tion with the context determined by the training ex ample. The explanation can be used to answer why questions involving the two decisions and the observed events:
The influence diagram in
• Why did you measure density?
• Why did you take the short path?
• Why did the table resist?
The explanation provides the directly relevant antece dents to the decisions and observed events. The con text provided by the training example determines whicli of many possible explanations is chosen and where the explanation stops: what is relevant and, most importantly, what is irrelevant.
The decision problem is subject to combinatorial ex plosion. In our example, the robot will have to solve the path-choice problem 200 times. Thus at each ter minal node in the decision tree there should be another decision tree. Since there are 15 non-ze�robability terminal nodes, this would require 15 terminal nodes. The approach used here follows the basic method of dynamic programming by breaking the large problem up into a multistage problem that can be solved one stage at a time. This reduces the number of paths to be explored from 15 200 to a more manageable 15*200.
In the following sections, the relationship between each figure and the underlying decision processes will be explained in more detail.
The Specific Explanation
Consider the specific explanation of the training ex ample as represented in Figure 1 . The nodes are num bered and will be referred to as N1, N2, and so on. Begin the analysis with the decision represented by N8. The decision to take the short path has the con sequences that the table resisted the box's weight with out breaking, thus leading to an outcome valued at 100 utils. The observation that the table resisted was fur nished by the training example, while the utility value was inferred from the statement of the decision problem, which is supplied along with the training ex ample. Starting at N7, the method examines the preconditions that must be fulfilled for the table to resist. The table can be either sturdy or fmgile, but N5 is a terminal node so no further regression can be done. At N6, the box can weigh less than or the same as the table, but there are two nodes that determine the value of this node. Go frrst to N4, a terminal node, and fmd the weight of the table. At N3 the weight of the box is unknown, but it can be determined by the density and volume, which are given in the training example, along with the formula Ior weight, whicli is part of the domain knowledge. Although it would be possible to represent explicitly the wetght formula, it has been omitted for conciseness. Once the values for nodes 1 and 2 are found, they are propagated down and the diagram corresponds to Figure 1. Figure 2 is the influence diagram of the generalized explanation that is built from the specific explanation in Figure 1 . The two major differences between the two figures are (1) the generalization from the in stances of Box-0 and Table-0 to the classes Box and  Table, and (2) the addition of three new nodes (NlO, Nll, N12) reflecting knowledge from the domain theory about measuring density. If the generalized ex planation structure in Figure 2 is well formed, enough mformation exists to transform it algorithmically into a decision tree that can be used to solve the decision problem.
The Generalized Explanation
For Figure 2 , let us consider frrst only the nodes that have been generalized, nodes 1 through 9. At Nl, it is stated that all boxes have densities of either .3 or .4, and that these are uniformly distributed among the population of boxes. From N2, boxes have a default volume of 10, giving at N3 an equal distribution of weights being either 3 or 4. Since fiom N4 tables have a default weight of 4, N6 has the conditional probabilities P(BoxWeight=TableWeight/N3, N4) =.50 P(BoxWeight<TableWeight/N3, N4) =.50 . The probabilities from N5, and N6, and the decision in N8 lead to nine conditional probabilities in N7. Eight of these are conditional on a decision to take the short path plus the three other pairs of probabilities from N5 and N6, while one is conditional on a possible decision at N8 to take the long path.
Before a decision is considered to measure density, the nine probabilities that are calculated at N7 correspond to the nine terminal nodes of the c5 branch of the oeci sion tree in Figure 3 . The probabilities are multiplied by the appropnate utilities at N9, which are propagated up the decision tree to give the expected utiltty of 44 at ilie second-level decision c5 in Figure 3. A decision must be made about whether or not to measure density before the path decision is made. If a box has a measured density of .5, the robot will be able to infer that the box weighs 4 units. If the measured density is .2, it will infer that the box weighs 3 units. Other measured densities provide no addiuonal infor mation over the basic information provided at Nl.
The inclusion of the density-measurement decision will require more probabilities to be calculated for state 1.
The robot wil have to consider the probability of each density value conditional on the dectsion to measure at N10, the error distribution at Nll, and the distribution 
PathDecision
Generalized Explanation for Choice-Of-Path Problem of densities among boxes at Nl. These four con ditional probabilities are prior information that will be come known with certainty at the time of the decision to choose a path. This is indicated by the informational arrow going from N12 into N8. This in turn requires four new sets of conditional probabilities to be cal culated at N7, with outcomes at N9, conditional on each possible outcome of the measurement act The appropriate probabilities can be found by tracing the upper brandies of the decision tree from b1 to the ter minal nodes. In state 1 there are 39 different paths through the decision tree , of which 24 terminate at some point with a zero probability of being taken.
The value of perfect information can be easily cal culated from the decision tree . Given perfect infor mation about box densities, utility will be maximized if (a) the short path is taken whenever a box weighs three units and (b) the long path is taken whenever a box weighs four units. The values of this strategy cor respond to values at nodes c1 and c4, each w1th as socmted probabilities of .5. The ex�ted utility of this plan is 55 utils. The expected utility of making the path decision without density measurement is only 44 utils (c5). If density measurement is performed, the optimal strategy in state 1 will be to take the short path in all cases except when measured density is .5. This will give an expected utility of 47.7 utils. Thus perfect information adds 11 utils over the uninformed choice, while density measurement adds 3.7 utils. In our ex ample, measurement costs nothing, but if its cost were eqUal or greater than 3.7 utils, it should not be done.
It is also possible to measure the value of perfect infor mation about the supportive capacity of tables. First, suppose that the robot correctly knows that the tables are Sturdy. Then the optimal strategy will be always to take the short path. The realized utility will be +20 for heavy boxes and +100 for light boxes, yielding an average utility for perfect information of 60. Next, suppose that the rooot knows correctly that the tables are Fragile. In this case, the current strategy in Fig. 3 is optimal, the utilities at d3 and d5 will be 40, and the realized utility for perfect information will be 45. The expected utility from perfect information will be the weighted sum of those two utilities, with weights depending on the robot's current beliefs in the strength of tables:
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= .2(60) + .8 (45) Perfect information about the strength of tables is thus worth only 0.33 utils, the difference between what he believes perfect information is worth (48.00 utils) and the expected value of his current strategy (47.67 utils).
A summary of what has been accomplished up to this point may be useful. First, we have solved one part of the explanation problem: A generalized explanation in the form of an influence diagram has been constructed from a problem statement ana a training example. The explanation can be used to answer why-questions in volving each decision and the observed consequences of the decision: Why was it decided to ... ? , and Why was it observed that ... .? The explanation uses con cepts that sometimes are not directly observable, such as the weight of a box or the expected utilities of an action, but the explanation is grounded in observable features, such as density, volume, table breaks, measured density, etc. Second, we have used the generalized explanation to construct a decision tree corresponding to state 1. Although a decision tree can always be derived from a well-formed influence diagT?ffi , it is not strictly necessary in order to solve the deciSion problem. It 1s possible to go from the in fluence dmgram directly to the solution, with the deci sion tree bemg only an implicit intermediate step. The decision tree was used to explain the details of the solution to the decision problem in state 1. The value of _perfect information and of a decision to gather more infOrmation was inferred from the available infor mation, and a decision was made to measure density and to choose a path conditional on this information. It remains to constder how the explanation and decisions are modified by inductive reaming as the robot progresses from one state to another.
Inductive Learning Between States
The passage between states occurs as a result of a stan dard series of transformation rules which can be sum marized as decide, observe, and update. The previous section discussed how to decide. The problem now is to observe and update so that inductive learning takes place. In order to illustrate how this is done, let us suppose that the box to be encountered at intersection 1, Box-1, has a measured density of .4, that the short path is taken and Box-1 is stacked on Table- and the likelihood ratio is The decision tree shows that when measured density is .5, the decision to take the long or short path depends on the expected utility of outcomes at the chance node el. The expected utility at e1 is -12. The decision will be changed to taking the short path if the expected utility at d1 is greater than + 10. This can be represented as
where EU(Fragile)=-20 is the ex�ted utility at node f1 of a decision to stack a box, given that the box's density is .4 and that the At that stage the robot will always choose the short path and will decide not to measure density.
The updating of probabilities can be done by any of several proposed procedures (Kim and Pearl 1983; Shacter 1986; Spiegelhalter 1986 ). In the present ex ample, the most straightforward way would be to up date directly the pro babilities in N5 after observing the outcome at N7 and, similarly, to update the probabilities at N1 after observing the outcome at N12.
The remaining probabilities can be directly calculated using the relations from the influence diagram to deter mine their values in the succeeding states .
S. Summary and Future Research
The T-BIL method integrates an essentially deductive learning method based on EBG with inductive learning methods from Bayesian decision theory. It takes as inputs a decision problem, a training example, and domain theory and constructs a generalization that ex plains why the example is a solution to the decision problem . The �eneraliZed explanation is represented as an influence diagram and is subject to the constraint that it be operational. It is used not only to explain events, but also as the basis for making sequential deci sions. Once the decisions are made in the initial state, a transition to a new state occurs. In the new state the outcomes of each dec ision are observed and the ex planation of observed events is revised using Bayesian updating. This procedure is iterative, thus :providing adaptive stochastic decision making. Learnmg takes place in a stochastic environment
The emphasis in T-Bll... has been on the integration of symbolic and quantitative methods. Although there has been much discussion of the interdisciplinary na ture of work in AI, there has in fact been very little exploitation of statistical and decision-analytic methods by AI workers. Perhaps surprisingly, there also has not been much migration of AI techniques into non-AI domains. As a colleague recently remarked, there are many conferences being given with the title "AI and X", where X is any other field. But when you look closely at the work being done and the people attend ing, tlie conference is mostly just X. T-Bll... has used these tools to provide fo ur advantages over EBG:
• Explanations include probabilistic and statistical reasoning.
• Explanations are related to decisions that have utility to decision makers .
• Explanations and decisions are revised in crementally on the basis of observation reports.
• Disjuncts can explicitly be represented in the explanation.
The next steps in my research program will be to im plement T-Bll... as a working program and to fm d suitable real-world applications. Since T-Bll... is a general technique that can deal with sequential deci sions in a stochastic environment, it sliould be ap plicable to a wide variety of problems. For example, much laboratory work of a scientific nature involves examining data in order to decide which of several competing hypotheses is most strongly supported. Statistical packages require the user to interpret the statistical results and make the decision. A program built using T-Bll... should be able to automate a substan tial portion of that decision-making process.
In the world of finance, a real-time trading program should be able to analyze stock-price data and change its view of the world based on a continuous inflow of new data (Star 1986) . Existing expert systems are not able to adapt quicklr enough to changes 10 the environ ment to be useful 10 the f1 0ancial arena. They also have difficulty dealing with statistical hypotheses. T Bll... should help us to solve some of these problems, thus moving us closer to the day when a financial program can act as an on-line real-time intelligent as sistant that will analyze data, accept or reject various different statistical hypotheses, and recommend the most profitable decisions on the basis of its analysis.
Another problem area where T-Bll... might prove to be useful involves the automatic diagnosis oi computer network problems (Maxion 1986; Lin and Siew10rek 1986) . Training examples based on specific types of faults could be used to � enerate more generalized ex planations of the system s behavior. If data from error logs were automatically monitored, as certain patterns of error reports appear, the automatic diagnostic system could propose the most likely hypotheses and alert the op erator as to a potential problem . As more data ar nve, T-BIL would lead to modifications of the initial hypotheses.
The particular actions recommended would depend in part on the cost associated with at tempting the specific repairs given the uncertain knowledge about the true state of the world.
Both symbolic and quantitative comJ?utational tech niques have proven themselves to provide very power-247 ful problem-solving paradigms. An optimistic view of the interdisciplinary work being attempted suggests that the result of integrating symbolic and quantitative methods will be synergistic. It is certainly an inter esting problem to be working on and one that is full of potential.
